COUNTERING YOUTH RADICALIZATION AND HOMEGROWN TERRORISM

By

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Abstract

The events that occurred on September 11/ 2001 changed the meaning of terrorism for many Canadians and brought the fear and reality of terrorism to the forefront. Large scale acts of terrorism in Canada have been quite rare; however, the fear continues. One of the concerns about terrorism is that, aside from homegrown terrorism, it involves people thousands of miles away from different backgrounds, cultures, legal structures, and objectives. Terrorist activities based on Islamic fundamentalism have been escalating throughout the world since early 2000. Even with the lack of major terror acts in Canada, youth radicalization makes the issue a relevant one in Canadian society. Whether the fear is proportionate to the level of threat, if left unaddressed, terrorist activities could flourish and undermine the safety and perception of safety for all Canadians. Consequently, this major paper strives to identify and evaluate potential solutions to minimize the threat of homegrown terrorism and address the underlying causes and processes associated with youth radicalization.

Terrorist attacks must be taken seriously in Canada. New approaches and policies are required to better understanding and effectively deal with radicalized individuals who are committed to engaging in acts of terrorism in Canada or against Canadians and Canadian interests abroad. Self-radicalized terrorists, in particular, share a unique typology that differs from other terrorists and, therefore, identifying their motives is very important. While some theorists believe the cause of terrorism is psychopathology, sociopathic, or mental illness, others argue that terrorism is the result of an identity crisis. With the use of social media and the internet, these individuals are disposed to further engage in their terrorist propaganda. To address this issue, the argument forwarded in this major paper is that there must be a shift from reactive approaches to more proactive approaches and strategies. This major paper concludes that both youth de-radicalization and countering of violent extremism in Canada are best addressed through a community collaboration approach.

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Table of Contents

Acronyms

ACAMS	**Association of Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialists**
BBC	**British Broadcasting Corporation**
CBSA	**Canada Border Services Agency**
CPRLV	**Center for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence**
CRA	**Canada Revenue Agency**
CSE	**Communication Security Establishment**
CSIS	**Canadian Security Intelligence Service**
CVE (WG)	**Counter Violent Extremism (Working Group)**
DSIS	**Danish Security and Intelligence Service**
FBI	**Federal Bureau of Investigation**
FCWG	**Faith Community Working Group**
Fin CEN	**Financial Crimes Enforcement Network**
FINTRAC	**Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre**
FLQ	**Liberation du Quebec**
IRC	**Islamic relief Canada**
ISIS	**Islamic State in Iraq and Syria**
NCA	**National Crime Agency**
NGO	**Non-Governmental Organization**
PSC	**Public Safety Canada**
RCMP	**Royal Mounted Canadian Police**
UK	**United Kingdom (of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)**
U.S.	**United States (of America)**

Introduction

Historical background

Terrorism is defined as a form of political violence (Matusitz & Breen, 2011; Sloan, 2006; Wittendorp, 2011), and radicalization to violence and mobilization to engage in terrorist activities are complex processes. On September 11, 2001, 19 terrorists hijacked and flew four airplanes into landmark American buildings, including the World Trade Centre (Hoffman, 2014). Throughout the next two decades, the terror continued in Western countries, including the commuter rail bombings in Madrid in 2004, the suicide attacks in London in 2005, the plot to bring down multiple passenger planes on route to North America in 2006, the aborted suicide bombings in New York in 2009, and, more recently attacks in Paris in 2015, Brussels and Berlin in 2016, Stockholm, and the United States to just name a few (Hoffman, 2014).

With the rise of new radical Islamic terror groups after 9/11 and a resurgence of far right-wing ideological hate groups, there is a growing concern regarding the number of Canadians who are embracing terrorist ideologies and activities (McCoy & Knight, 2015), exemplified by the actions of John Nuttall and Amanda Korody in British Columbia (R v. Nuttall, 2016), as well as the terror attacks in Montreal and on Parliament Hill. In 2014, a homegrown terrorist engaged in a suspected suicide mission, entering the nation's Parliament and murdering a Canadian Armed Forces reservist in the process (McCoy & Knight, 2015). In 2017, in Edmonton, Alberta, there was a terrorist attack that involved a stabbing and vehicle-ramming attack that killed police constable Mike Chernyk by Abdulahi Sharif, a man who had pledged allegiance to ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and al-Syria). In this attack, four pedestrians were also hit with a rental truck during a police chase (Toronto Sun, 2017).

As a result of the actions by Islamic terrorist groups, Muslim communities have been subjected to acts of terrorism and violence. For example, in January 2017, six Muslims were killed in a shooting at a Quebec City mosque by Alexandre Bissonnette, a 23 years old student at Université Laval who had far-right, white nationalist, and anti-Muslim views. Bissonnette did not belong to any terrorist group; however, his hatred towards Muslims could be the result of Islamophobia or a fear or hatred of Muslims, in part as a response to what some Islamic terror groups have done. As Islamic radicalization and Islamic extremism continues to grow so does the number of Islamophobia incidents by white-nationalists. Given this, there is a level of fear about terrorist attacks among Canadians that has increased in recent years as a result of jihadist movements, such as ISIS, and right-wing ideological racist groups, including those with Islamophobic ideologies (Hoffman, 2014).

One of the greatest challenges in preventing Islamic terror attacks is preventing transnational communication, while ensuring proactive international collaboration and consistent protocols exist (Olson et al., 2005). This is because one of the fundamental aspects of radicalization is recruitment and information sharing among radicalized members to people throughout the world. If it were possible to stop communication between individuals in a country with terrorist groups, regardless of where they are found, it would be much easier to prevent and reduce the number of terror attacks. Not only does transnational communication help recruit new members to terror groups, but also increases the ability of these groups to plan and fund their terror activities, and to spread their message.

The rising threat of violent extremism has corresponded with the number of terror attacks, the proliferation of literature on radicalization, the acceptance of violent extremism by many young people throughout the world, and, to a lesser extent, the methods and

strategies used by Western governments to combat it (Bonokoski, 2017 & Chin, 2015). As radicalization has appeared to be increasing in recent years, Canadian officials should be aware of the risk that homegrown terrorism poses to Canada, especially given the research suggesting that the planning cycle of self-directed extremists is becoming increasingly shorter, and subsequently more difficult to foil by law enforcement and intelligent service (Toronto Sun, 2017). Individuals who are willing to act alone and are characterized as being self-radicalized do not share a typical profile, and their experiences and motives are remarkably distinct, which makes them difficult to identify and stop. In fact, the course of an individual's radicalization or mobilization can start, slow, accelerate, or even stop based on a multitude of factors (Altier, Boyle, & Neil, 2017)

The ideology of Islamic extremism is the constant variable in the equation of youth radicalization and homegrown terrorism, while recognizing that this is not the only group of people engaged in terrorism and radicalization. As mentioned above, the effects of right-wing extremism on local and national youth radicalization cannot be neglected. However, while there are many groups that get classified as Islamic extremists or Islamic terror groups, it is important to keep in mind that these groups do not all share a single ideology or organizational/command structure (Shahzad, 2014). In fact, the various structures that these groups can take in Canada and abroad make it extremely difficult for law enforcement and intelligence officials in Canada to counter or infiltrate while ensuring that their activities respect the rule of law, the legal requirements of fair procedure, and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

With the extensive manipulation of Islam through social media, terror groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda have successfully radicalized and recruited young foreign fighters from around the globe and has implored extremists to attack Western targets (Bell, 2014). Since

2014, numerous terrorist attacks have taken place in Europe and U.S. by al-Qaeda and ISIS, which, in addition to taking a toll in terms of direct and indirect victims, has exacerbated the anxiety and fear among citizens in these countries (Moghaddam, 2006). The key question posed in this major paper is, given the chance for further terror attacks in Canada, what kind of preventative approaches are more practicable to respond specifically to Islamic extremism ideology and youth radicalization.

This major paper will identify the issue of homegrown terrorism among Canadian Muslim youth and will focus on identifying the main theoretical explanations for why and how Western Muslim youth are radicalized and join extremist groups. Several theoretical explanations for involvement in terror organizations, such as relative deprivation, social movement theory, and psychological perspectives, will be explored, in terms of their explanatory value in understanding the drivers of radicalization and violent extremism.

Although radicalization discourse can create a false and stigmatizing equivalence between Muslims and terrorism, the fact that youth in Western countries have been radicalized to join terrorist groups, such as ISIS, requires much greater scrutiny, understanding, and action by Canadian officials (Blackwood, Hopkins, & Reicher, 2016). This major paper aims to identify some of the obstacles faced by the Canadian officials in identifying, preventing, and responding to those youth at-risk of violent extremism and those who have been radicalized. Also, this major paper will outline a possible framework for Canada to expand its Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) program and implement a three-pronged program focusing on counter-radicalization, de-radicalization, and reintegration at the local government level, with a focus on youth and the preventive diagnosis of radicalization symptoms. This major paper will highlight the contributions of educational or societal withdrawal, lifestyle changes, supporting and perpetrating vandalism or violence on

behalf of an ideology, actively seeking new authority figures, demonstrating commitment to a new ideological community and its mission, and acquiring practical training in the use of firearms to the radicalization of youth (Klausen, Campion, Needle, Nguyen & Libretti, 2016).

Homegrown terrorism is a serious problem for a very small minority of Muslims in the United States and Canada (Schanzer et al., 2010). Weine (2012) argued that "building community resilience is a matter of sustaining and strengthening protective resources in all areas of the community through increasing protection for adolescents and young adults, increasing awareness of parents, and developing community strategies to address threats"(p.66). While some theorize that the process leading to terrorism is due to psychopathology, sociopathic, or mental illness (Post, 1990), other researchers view radicalization as a by-product of group identity or social interactions and processes (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) or as part of a 'collective identity crisis' in the Islamic world (Moghaddam, 2006).

The Definition of Radicalization and Islamic Extremism

Borum (2011) defined radicalization as the process by which people come to support terrorism and violent extremism and, in some cases, join terrorist groups. However, there is not an agreed upon definition of radicalization. The research suggests that the process of radicalization is based on cultural cleavages, socioeconomic and personal factors, such as the shock of a life changing event, and the influence of a mentor (Vidino, 2010). Studying radicalization, in particular, the ideology and beliefs of individuals, is highly complex; however, there is a growing consensus that the radicalizing factors of youth are rooted in socio-economic factors or the lack of social and cultural integration, a lack of economic opportunity, and a lack of employment. When hope and opportunity are eclipsed, extremism will often feed off of the resulting despair (Borum, 2011).

Danish Security and Intelligence Service (DSIS) focuses on “violent radicalization,” and define it as “a process by which a person to an increasing extent accepts the use of undemocratic or violent means, including terrorism, in an attempt to reach a specific political/ideological objective” (Edwards, 2015, P. 102). The FBI, on the other hand, defines radicalization as a process by which an individual can become to believe their engagement in or their facilitation in non-state violence to achieve social and political change is necessary and justified (FBI, 2014). McCauley & Moskalenko (2008) identified radicalization as a movement of “beliefs, feelings, and behaviors in directions that increasingly justify intergroup violence and demand sacrifice in defense of the in-group” (P. 415).

The study of radicalization is highly debated, which leaves it somewhat open to interpretation and misunderstanding. The term radicalization has been applied to groups or populations perceived as politically marginal or ideologically threatening (Vidino, 2010), but, as Bartlett and Miller (2012) have argued, radicalization can be non-violent or violent in nature. Taking the definitions presented above, this major paper will use the following to define radicalization. Radicalization is the process where individuals, particularly those who are rooted in undesirable socio-economic factors, such as having a lack of social and cultural integration or have a lack of fair economic opportunities, come to support, engage, and participate in undemocratic, violent, and morally unjust behavior to achieve a specific political or ideological objective.

Islamism is an ideology that imposes conformity with Sharia law. Sharia law is the Islamic religious law forming part of the Islamic tradition. It is derived from the religious precepts of Islam, particularly the Quran and the Hadith. Islamism views violence as an acceptable means to establishing, maintaining, and following Sharia law. Under an Islamic radicalized interpretation of Sharia law, the use of violence is acceptable when violence is

seen as the only means to reach the objective of establishing Sharia Law (Jordan & Boix, 2004). When considered with the general aim of reordering and structuring society in accordance with Islamic law, violent struggle can be viewed as a necessary element to eradicate obstacles to restoring God's rule on Earth and defending the Muslim community against infidels and apostates (BBC, 2014). It is with this understanding that, for example, the British government defined Islamic radicalization as any form of Islam that opposes democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs (Borum, 2011).

As for this major paper, the related terms of Islamist extremism, Islamic radicalization, and Islamism refer to a tendency or an acceptance of violence to reorder a government and society in accordance with Islamic law, a rejection of Western influences, and the transformation of faith into ideology to push people from different cultural, social and economic backgrounds towards extremist forms of Islam. For example, ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and Boko Haram are well-known extremist Islamic groups that have emerged in regions characterized by a history of exploitation, poverty, poor governance, and marginalization.

In effect, radicalization is a process by which a person accepts the use of undemocratic or violent means, including terrorism, as a legitimate and acceptable way to achieve or influence a specific ideological objective (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008; Borum, 2011). Therefore, youth radicalization and Islamic radicalism are linked by the process of forming an extremist view that has a high propensity to encourage violent attitudes or violent action.

What is Youth Radicalization?

Youth radicalization can be defined as a "series of changes in beliefs, feelings, and behaviors that increasingly justify intergroup violence and demand sacrifice in defense of

the in-group" (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, P 420). Research shows that recruitment into gangs and recruitment into terrorism is similar (Malcolm, 2016). There are similar methods and motives towards joining extremist groups. With respect to Islamic radicalization, youth who are mostly the second generation of Middle Eastern immigrants can be frustrated by insufficient and less-quality programs and services that are offered in their community, making them easier targets for extremist narrators and YouTube videos that promote the benefits of joining and participating in terrorist activities.

Radicalization is a process of transformation based on particular social-psychological developments (King &Tylor, 2011), and is the process of forming an extremist view that has a high propensity to result in violent attitudes or violent action This can be driven by a wide range of socio-economic factors, such as income inequality, poverty, state instability, unemployment, lack of political participation, lack of education, state-citizen distrust, social marginalization, social media, cultural cleavages, discrimination, and a range of personal factors, such as low self-esteem , psychological factors, influence of a mentor, life changing events, and religious fundamentalism (Bartlett & Miller, 2012). The focus on youth is because people in this age range are most likely to be susceptible to the teaching of a charismatic leader, teacher, or mentor, and experience the aforementioned variables most acutely (Clare, 2011). Radicalization may not necessarily lead to violence, but is one of several risk factors required for someone to engage in an act of terrorism.

Radicalization trajectories have been understood as deriving primarily from a personal crisis, traumatic events, and disillusionment. These elements have been found in over 90% of cases in the first part of the radicalization trajectory described as "pre-radicalization" (Klausen et al., 2016). A dogmatic interpretation of Islam and a degree of

sectarian hate serve to transform the “pre-radicalization” youth into the next stage, which is referred to as “self-identification”, “indoctrination”, or “jihadization” (Klausen et al., 2016).

Historical, sociological, and psychological factors play a critical role in this process. Group relative deprivation, identity conflicts, and personality characteristics are three psychological factors that have emerged from the research as key contributors to radicalization (King& Taylor, 2011). Radicalization has been defined as a psycho-social process of gradual progress from context to thought to action (Özerdem & Podder, 2011). Youth unemployment, underemployment, unequal access to education and skills, and a lack of socialization or integration into the macro-society or culture are some of the factors that lead to youth disconnection and can serve as motivators for radicalization among some young people.

Social identity theory is Henri Tajfel’s (1986) greatest contribution to psychology. Social identity is a person’s sense of who they are based on their group membership. Social Identity Theory explains why some youth radicalize and can inform an effective paradigm for the de-radicalization of young people. Social Identity Theory asserts that youth seek belonging within a group, which comprises their identity and worldview. In some cases of radicalization, “young men turn to extremism in their search for identity acceptance and purpose which they are unable to find in the community more often concerned with wealth accumulation rather than healthy relationship-building” (Bizina & Gray, 2014, P.600). Creating this belonging may have the power to inform an identity that is resilient to the false promises that radicalization may hold (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The social construction of this belonging requires an in-group and an out-group. Essentially, different groups within society divide between an “us versus them” mentality, where group members of an in-group will seek to find negative aspects of an out-group, thus enhancing their self-image (McLeod,

2008). This can lead to or escalate conflicts between groups. This type of social framing can lead to issues like racism, extreme beliefs about an opposing group, or discrimination (McLeod, 2008).

To understand youth radicalization requires both an individual and a societal or cultural examination of context-specific variables. For example, youth who experience religious or social discrimination may be pushed toward a more conservative and less tolerant type of Islamic practice, which might make them more susceptible to radicalization (Abbas, 2012). Experts argue that growing mistrust and negative opinion about their government's foreign policy is a major driver for Western youth to become more radicalized and join ISIS and other terrorist groups. Where there is a negative perception, especially in the Muslim community, about the lack of access to educational facilities and other social resources, youth may experience relative deprivation, which, in turn, might cause radicalization (LaFree, Gary, Smarick & Fishman, 2010). Inequality theory is an extension of relative deprivation theory arguing that the blend of economic inequality and the issue of race increases one's feelings of injustice. Negative consequences of inequality, such as alienation, frustration, and crime can contribute to radicalization (Gurr, 1970).

There is some common understanding among government officials, policymakers, practitioners, and academics that there are both a number of situational variables and ideological factors that contribute to increasing the risk of terrorism (Francis, 2012). Marginalization, poverty, and modernity are frequently used as examples of situational variables that contribute to terrorism. It is clear, when considering the principles and views of Islamists that the internet, urbanization, and western culture has had a marginalizing effect on Muslims, leaving a large segment of the population and groups of people isolated in sub-cultures that do not connect to the macro-cultures of the countries these people find

themselves in. As mentioned above, this situation increases the divide between “us” and “them”, which has a negative effect on social identity and can contribute to radicalization.

In addition, Islamic radicalization can emerge from religious and political currents within Muslim communities (Sageman, 2013). Research among refugee and immigrant families from African and other countries indicated the importance of numerous factors, such as family solidarity, transnational family, parent-child communication, parental monitoring and supervision, and parental school involvement as playing a role in putting youth at risk for radicalization (McGoldrik, Giordanoa, & Garcia-Petro, 2005). However, while these variables do appear to play a role in the radicalization of some Muslim youth, it is important to recognize that these factors could be generalized to all youth, regardless of their religion background or residency status.

Radicalization and mobilization are distinct, but often intertwined processes (Crone, 2016). Radicalization is a highly individualized process through which a person becomes convinced that violence is a legitimate, and eventually individually obligated, means to advance their ideological cause or beliefs. According to Gartenstein and Gross (2009), there are six main processes that move a Muslim youth towards radicalization. These factors are (1) the adoption of a legalistic interpretation of Islam, (2) identifying with and accepting an ideologically rigid group of religious authorities, (3) adopting a hostile view toward the West as being irreconcilably opposed to Islam, (4) manifesting a low tolerance for perceived religious deviance, (5) attempting to impose one’s newly adopted religious beliefs on others, and (6) the expression of radical political views.

The threat of terrorism is real and serves as a telltale sign that more should be done to understand the reasons and motivations why youth join terrorist groups. Understanding the underlying reasons of terrorism better would contribute to the development of a more

effective framework for ascertaining the main 'vulnerability factors' associated with radicalization and terrorism before the aforementioned vulnerabilities are exploited by those who embrace terrorism as an acceptable form of political and religious expression. Working toward a better understanding of the problem and building effective prevention strategies are essential for authorities and communities.

Who is at the Risk of Radicalization?

The generally accepted view of youth radicalization is that those most at risk are second and third-generation immigrants who are citizens of a western country simply because that is where they were born, but do not hold strong allegiances to that country (King & Taylor, 2011). In addition to a degree of social, economic, political, and religious isolation that they feel, the internet can play an important role in providing a surrogate community for disenfranchised youth and filling this void. Moreover, some youth are attracted to real or virtual violence, which can contribute to the success of the radicalization process. While not entirely endorsed by the academic and research community, there are studies that have demonstrated that youth who routinely view violence on the internet have a greater likelihood of similar aggressive and violent behavior (Escobar & Anderson, 2008). Moreover, youth are highly susceptible to media representations of violence and habitual childhood exposure to media violence can increase the risk for engaging in violence. Given this, parents, schools, and the community have important roles to play in de-escalating the potential for violence through integrating youth better, being assertive in their opposition to violence, providing alternatives to engaging in violence, and improving interpersonal communication with youth. Supervision and control of a youth's media use, and discussions about what the youth is viewing online are some obvious preventative approaches that can be taken with youth.

The theory of relative deprivation can apply to many Muslim youth because there is a perceived discrepancy in their value expectations and value capabilities that lead to social discontent. This perceived gap creates frustration that can lead to aggression (McLean & Fraser, 2009). Understanding the thinking and beliefs, as well as the narratives that ultimately result in a youth engaging in an act of terrorism is not always clear, and the motivations and drivers that fuels terrorist violence is even less clearly defined (Change Institute, 2008). Those who radicalize youth focus on a range of youth vulnerabilities that may be associated with social class, immigration status, criminal record, mental health, family life, or peer group (Wolfberg, 2012).

The process of radicalization and adoption of violent extremism is catalyzed by two factors that are known as “push” and “pull” factors. Push factors are forces that can alienate people or cause them to reject mainstream society, such as a lack of access to adequate education or gainful employment, and difficulty with social integration or perceived discrimination. A push factor frequently relates to a situation or an event that is present in the country from which a person migrates, and can take the form of some economic, political, environmental, or social issue. It is generally some issue that contributes to the youth identifying with those from their ‘homeland’ and a perspective that their ‘adopted’ country is at fault or have played some role in the issue. Again, social marginalization, government repression, or unemployment are examples of push circumstances that make a youth frustrated with their current lifestyle or the condition of their fellow Muslims in another country. Pull factors are described as appeals from terrorist networks or radicals, such as propaganda or trigger events, and attacks or assassinations against Muslim populations that draw persons to accept the extremist ideology. The sense of belonging, propaganda, trigger events, financial incentives, or the desire for adventure or glory can

serve as pull factors that make a violent extremist ideology more attractive to an individual and serves to draw them into a radical ideology (Mia et al., 2016).

In addition to push and pull factors, there are three primary motivational factors that often lead to radicalization. Those motivational factors are young people looking for meaning, seeking to establish a bond or gaining recognition, and individuals who perceive an injustice inflicted upon themselves or other similarly situated persons (Heyman, Gordon, & Watson, 2009). Sageman (2008) identified a four-stage process of radicalization. The first stage is a sense of "moral outrage," followed by a stage that interprets the outrage in a specific way that in the mind of the individual is an act challenging them to action. Stage three has an ideological appeal and resonates with the individual's personal experience, and it is regarded as part of a larger war. The fourth stage is one in which individuals are essentially mobilized (recruited) via networks either online or face-to-face.

In this way, socially isolated, disenchanted young men turn to extremism in their search for identity, acceptance, and purpose that they are unable to find otherwise (Bizina & Gray, 2014). Emotions, such as frustration, anger, rage, and alienation, are some of the factors that play into any and all of the aforementioned stages, and they serve as building blocks as the individual moves from one stage to the other. Moral outrages of perceived injustices against Muslims, such as the war in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, the public burning of the Quran, the perception that Muslims are discriminated against by Western countries, Islamophobia, and acts that insult Islam or he Prophet Mohammed are powerful igniters of moral outrage, and they conform to the indicators developed by Sageman.

From a counter-terrorism policy perspective, the issue of radicalization by Islamic fundamentalist and extremist groups of second-generation Muslim youth born in Western countries has become a major concern (Wolfberg, 2012). A general tendency to struggle

with their identity as Muslims first and Western citizens second strengthens their sense of being an 'other' that is marginalized and socially isolated; all of which makes them susceptible to extremism and the call to global jihad (Bizina & Gray, 2014).

It is important to understand that not all youth who are radicalized can be classified as brainwashed 'victims' of 'radical' groups' whose extremist ideas serve as 'cognitive openings' to the world of terrorism (Wiktorowicz, 2005). Instead, it might be helpful to understand that some of these youth are willing members who seek out this lifestyle and contribute to online terrorist forums, create YouTube terrorist propaganda channels, hold Twitter accounts that spread terrorist propaganda, manage active Facebook profiles, and create online blogs advocating violent Islamist extremism (U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 112th Congress, 2012).

General Approaches Taken by UK and U.S. to Control Radicalization

Jenkins (2001) argued that 84% of the designers and perpetrators of terrorist operations in the U.S. were born in that country or were its citizen, and 66% of them were Muslim (Homeland Security, 2012). As a result, de-radicalization strategies and appropriate measures should be adopted to address religious discrimination and anti-Muslimism as an important aspect of the fight against Islamic extremism and terrorism. In terms of combatting violent extremism, typically there are two forms; countering violent extremism, which focuses on prevention and mitigating the effects of those already radicalized to engage in violent extremism, while also attempting to minimize the number of individuals who join violent extremist groups (Ramakrishna, 2017), and de-radicalization, which is a remedial process of instigating a shift in the beliefs of the individual such that they disengage from a radical ideology (Mia *et al*., 2016). Current de-radicalization interventions involve attempts to prevent an individual from returning to violent extremism, rather than

preventing the radicalization process in the first instance (Mia, Gharaibeh, Jeffrey, & Deeb, 2016). The UK government has created the Channel Program, as part of their Prevent strategy in response to increasing rates of radicalization (Gayle, 2016). The UK's Channel Program focused on ensuring that vulnerable children or adults of any faith, ethnicity, or background receive support before their vulnerabilities are exploited by those that would want them to embrace terrorism" (Gayle, 2016).

The UK Channel works by identifying individuals who are at risk, assessing the nature and extent of their risk, and then developing the most appropriate support plan for that individual (Channel Guidance, 2018). The support plans often a multi-agency approach, where agencies and organizations come together to help the individual which could include anything from providing the individual with adult mentorship, life or educational skills, housing support, and even drug/alcohol support (Channel Guidance, 2018). The main focus of the program is to focus on building strong and resilient individuals and communities (McDonough, 2011). Despite the concerns among Muslim communities about the integrity and trustworthiness of the Prevent program, the UK has attempted to include education in their de-radicalization strategy (Weine, 2012).

To date, the U.S. government has drawn upon the UK's Prevent strategy in developing Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programs. CVE programs and many other policies are designed to prevent individuals and groups from radicalizing and mobilizing to commit violence. These programs tend to have three overall objectives. First, respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat from those who promote it. Second, prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support, and third, to work with sectors and institutions where there are increased risks of people being radicalized. These three aims are addressed by working

directly with at-risk communities, using the principles of community policing, and working with partners in other countries (Weine, 2012).

The U.S. is a good country to study because they represent many of the strategies, programs, and policies that characterize community-based initiatives, partnering with religious leaders, working with various levels of government, and addressing the concerns of communities. The U.S. federal government has undertaken many initiatives to shift youth's behavior away from violent activities and violent extremist groups. Disengagement is a strategy for the cessation of participating in extreme violent activities and countering radicalization and violent extremism. Widespread concerns about some Muslim diaspora communities in the U.S. are leading many to develop processes, models, strategies, and programs to counter the development of homegrown violent extremism (Hunter, Ryan & Henke, 2011).

In the U.S., as a part of President Obama's policy, the FBI devised and implemented many resilience strategies that formed the basis of three broad initiatives to securing cooperation in criminal investigations and intelligence-gathering (Haberfeld, King, & Lieberman, 2009). This included monitoring online communications as a means to intervening on online extremist forums and as a way to identify radical discussions and participants online to alert law enforcement officials about youth who were at the risk of radicalization.

Regarding resilience-focused policies, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in 2011 began to convene community meetings in Muslim-American communities around the country. This was, in part, in response to the Obama Administration's policy statement in August 2011 entitled *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States* that stated that ''our best defenses against this threat are well informed and

equipped families, local communities, and institutions'' (The White House, 2011). Local police departments in the U.S. have been applying some of these counterterrorism elements in their work in Muslim-American communities and incorporating these tactics into their community policing strategies (Coaffee & Rogers, 2008). Community policing combines a reactive approach to services with a proactive approach to problem-solving in which local citizens are seen as partners (Haberfeld et al., 2009). For example, officers have begun to engage with children and youth in more friendly manners in order to break some of the barriers that these individuals and their family members may have against police in the United States (Weine, 2012). The idea behind this is that if we can break barriers and create greater support and trust between at-risk youth or minority groups and with police, then we may be to prevent entry into radicalization.

Countering Violent Extremism Approaches in Canada

In Canada, the focused of countering violent extremism programs has been on those "who have not yet crossed the line into violent extremism or terrorist acts" (Chin, 2015). The numerous countering violent extremism programs represent the understanding that there is a need to counter radicalization, and policymakers have been increasingly concerned about this issue, triggering a number of government initiatives and programs (Upal, 2015). Government countering strategies seek to mitigate the factors that could lead to radicalization in a community and prevent the potential transition of young people to violent extremism (Mia, Gharaibeh, Jeffrey, & Deeb, 2016).

Since youth largely radicalize for psychological and social reasons, Canada's preventative and remedial measures must address the underlying issues that lead to radicalization and the adoption of violent measures in the first place. (Euer et al., 2014). The Ministry of Public Safety and the RCMP are leading these programs; however, their de-

radicalization efforts have not adequately incorporated the community level relationships that is necessary. The formation of these countering approaches stem from government or police-based practices, rather than community based. This is problematic because without these community-based connections and supports some vulnerable youth may be missed and may continue to be recruited as foreign fighters or incited to commit domestic terror plots.

Canada's formal efforts to counter violent extremism was initiated with the formation of the Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams (INSET) in 2002, with a mandate to enhance the capacity and intelligence-sharing among partners within provincial and municipal police departments (RCMP, 2014). Since most youth countering approaches are implemented to prevent violent extremism, youth preventive measures in Canada is best served through a community collaboration approach (Monaghan, 2014). With many youth getting drawn into radical ideologies and joining local and international groups, the Canadian response to the threat of radicalization has mostly been through government support, which it hopes would counter any offers, such as financial payments, offered by extremist groups (Kilford, 2014). The countering of violent extremism process takes a two-pronged approach that includes the "de-radicalization of attitudes and beliefs" and "the disengagement from violent behaviour and the process of leaving violent groups and reintegrating into other social groups" and has often been viewed as the reverse process of radicalization (Porta & LaFree, 2012, p.10).

With the aim of de-radicalizing youth, as an example, Canada established the Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence program (CPRLV) in March 2015 in Montreal to serve the Montreal and Quebec areas as a non-profit organization (CPRLV, 2016). Its approach included prevention and skills development, research, and psychological

intervention to provide resources through a 24/7 hotline and some additional online tools and guides, such as the behaviour barometer to recognize behaviour symptoms of radicalization leading to violence (CPRLV, 2016). This program is based on the foundation of community support, giving community members, including parents, teachers, and neighbors, the tools and resources to identify, support, and mentor at-risk individuals.

ReDirect is another program in Canada established by Calgary Police Department as a "prevention and education program aimed at youth and young adults vulnerable to becoming radicalized before they develop extremist ideologies or intentions" (Calgary Police Department, 2016). Similar to CPRLV, ReDirect focuses on education and setting up an awareness hub to stop the youth radicalization process through prevention programs. This initiative program relies on confidential referrals and does not target any particular segment of society (Calgary Police Department, 2016). Since CPRLV and ReDirect are relatively new programs, the evaluation of their long-term effectiveness and success is not currently available; however, success is likely if the program continues to follow the principles of community support and engagement.

Youth with the immigrant background can play an important role in assisting with those at risk for radicalization because they can serve as a role model and mentor for those having trouble balancing their cultural identity and their Canadian identity. The characters of second generation youth are very different from their parents' identities (Lyons-Padilla et al., 2015). For example, second-generation Muslim youth often have very little connection, from a cultural or language standpoint, to their parents' birth country (Lyons-Padilla et al., 2015). However, second generation youth also feel somewhat left out and cannot always fit into the macro culture. They may feel like "outsiders" or be treated as such by others, which can lead to frustration and alienation, and ultimately radicalization.

The Role of Social Media

Social media as a propaganda tool of extremism narratives has deviated perceptions of religion. For example, ISIS has been very successful at using social media platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter to identify vulnerable youth that are susceptible to their propaganda material and their extremist views. In response, parental scrutiny and screening of their children's activities in cyberspace where Islamic extremist propaganda is highly active is a crucial early preventive step that parents can take, in addition to the responsibility of the owners of these social network platforms to ensure that extremist views, videos, and forums are taken down.

The use of social media by violent extremists is often sophisticated in terms of their ability to manipulate at-risk youth. The main way in which Islamic extremists use social media are for propaganda, intimidation, recruitment, and fundraising (Awan, 2017). Radicalization is encouraged directly or indirectly on the Internet through extremist propaganda, Internet, social media, and bulletin boards. Terrorist groups, such as ISIS, routinely use the Internet and social media sites to spread their propaganda, share information, data mine, fundraise, communication, and recruitment (Awan, 2017).

In the U.S. and Canada, most of the radical youth belong to a growing breed of young people who are very familiar and comfortable with social media. The lack of social integration, lack of economic participation, social isolation, exclusion, and being viewed as "second class citizen" have contributed to a growing sense of frustration that can facilitate a youth's radicalization and recruitment to violent extremism online without any need for a potential recruit to travel abroad for instruction or education (U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 112th Congress, 2012).

In effect, the very basic aspects of social media, such as its volume, speed, multimedia interactivity, horizontality, decentralization, cheapness, anonymity, and global audience offers clear advantages to extremist groups that may otherwise have stayed marginal (Awan, 2017). Despite efforts by Western governments to prevent youth from joining extremist groups, the internet and social media play a facilitating role in the radicalization processes, especially among youth (Awan, 2017). Internet and social media is an active vector for violent radicalization that facilitates the proliferation of violent extremist ideologies and continues to be used very effectively to recruit and radicalize young people (Kamall, 2015).

Information Sharing

Countering terrorism and violent extremism must target the sources of funding of these efforts and groups. In short, terrorist activity financing is the use of funds, property, or other services to encourage, plan, assist, recruit, or engage in acts of terrorism, where the primary motivation is not financial gain (OSCE, 2018). As Tufts University international business professor Ibrahim Warde pointed out in “The Price of Fear: The Truth Behind the Financial War on Terror”, in a culture that refuses to explore the social and political roots of non-state terrorism, money becomes a default ‘cause’, even though relatively little is required to conduct a terrorist attack, “and such amounts can easily bypass the formal banking system” (Cooper, 2008, p.178).

FINTRAC (the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre) is a key component of Canada’s strategy with respect to deterring and detecting terrorist financing. In order to protect the integrity and security of Canada's financial transactions, FINTRAC carefully monitors financial transaction reports for hints of suspicious behavior. FINTRAC is part of the Egmont Group, a global network of like-minded financial analysis organizations, and

collaborates with these other organizations to monitor money laundering and terrorist funding on an international level. Other prominent Egmont Group members include the United States' Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (Fin CEN) and the UK's National Crime Agency (NCA). FINTRAC has contributed to the fight against terrorism and the prevention of radicalization recruitment by identifying and preventing suspicious transactions from known terrorist or criminal organizations to individuals in Canada. By eliminating financial transactions, it hinders the ability for these terrorist or radicalized groups to operate. In addition, there is a greater need for intelligence sharing among the multitude of institutions, actors, and stakeholders that are active in the provision of internal security in the areas of diagnosing and taking preventive measures (Remuss, 2010). In 2006, amendments to the act enabled FINTRAC to share even more such personal information with law enforcement and security agencies, the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA), and the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA).

Countering violent extremism should always be a top priority of the government. Doing so requires both security responses and measures to enhance collective efficacy and social cohesion (Gelber, 2018). Improved multijurisdictional communication, including shared databases, is a key concern with cross-jurisdictional offenses, such as terrorism, because the lack of information sharing limits the ability of counter-terrorism efforts (Matusitz & Breen, 2011; Malone, 2005). Jean-Paul Laborde, Executive Director of the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate, said that “terrorism was an international threat requiring a global response” (United Nations Security Council Meeting, 2016). Although this is focused on global terror as a whole, it is related to radicalization as radicalization is the starting point of a terror threat. Since radicalization can snowball into a major terror issue, it

is important to be able to identify potential cases of youth radicalization when investigating or responding to global terror threats.

One proposed solution is a shared database that would provide ongoing, current information that countries could use to fight terrorism (Olsen *et al*., 2005; Malone, 2005). Fighting crime and terrorism is a collective endeavor, and intelligence work is only a part of it. The contribution of financial intelligence to this fight continues to increase rapidly, with FINTRAC at the core of this effort. In 2010, Public Safety Canada (PSC), with collaboration from 18 government departments and agencies, initiated the Combating Violent Extremism Working Group (CVEWG) with the objective of "information exchange and collaboration" to prevent violent extremism (Monaghan, 2014).

Mobilization is the process by which a radicalized individual moves from an extremist intent to preparatory steps to engage in terrorist activity, such as an attack, travel for extremist purposes, or facilitating the terrorist activity of someone else (Cooper, 2008). FINTRAC's mandate was expanded in December 2001 to provide the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) with information on terrorist financing that threaten the security of Canada. In light of terrorist attacks in Canada, with collaboration of Fintrac, CSIS has updated and enhanced its analysis of the process of mobilization to terrorist activities by identifying, preventing, and eliminating financial transactions, it hinders the ability for these terrorist or radicalized groups to mobilize and perpetrate terrorist activities (Gill, Horgan, Corner & Silver, 2016).

Many extremist mobilizers demonstrate signs of observable "leakage", which are the detectable range of activities and behaviours that individuals who are mobilizing display to those around them (Basra, Neumann & Brunner, 2016). These activities are often unavoidable in the course of planning a terrorist attack. Information sharing between law

enforcement and the community can help identify these leakages and provide information to prevent violence or other extremist activities and can assist in the development of effective intervention strategies.

Sharing experiences, resources, and knowledge will aid in the development of responses by bringing all the intelligence agencies, police, and law enforcement together for a common purpose of countering terrorism and youth radicalization (Malone, 2005). This partnership would aid in facilitating communication and provide a sense of shared purpose. Combined responses will also assist them in learning how best to respond, develop shared strategies, and create best practices. For it to be effective, it must be a multi-agency, multi-department, and multi-government collaboration that includes everyone from the top government officials, financial institutions, to the police and even community members, such as parents, neighbors and religious leaders. Information should also flow both top-down and bottom-up, as this ensures no information is missed or deemed too minor. However, the challenges to this seemingly simple solution are many, including funding for such an undertaking, leadership and ownership of the program, privacy concerns, and jurisdictional concerns. Government must ensure that legislation is in place that helps minimize such challenges, such as allowing information sharing to occur under the name of national security.

Information sharing and collaboration between police, security agencies, and moderate religious leaders is also necessary. Most of the religious leaders have the responsibility to report any suspicious activity or imminent danger, but this should work both ways; police, specifically community police officers, in Canada should also notify a trusted person from the religious group if they become aware of an at-risk youth. This needs to be done is a manner that does not jeopardize any security investigations, thus it is very

important to make sure the relationship between community police and religious leaders is very good. The expectation is that moderate religious leaders would then engage in a dialogue with the at-risk youth, provide religious guidance, correct misperceptions of religious teachings and text, or simply provide a safe space for the youth to express his or her worldviews. Although these leaders may not be able to determine the root cause or what the underlying factors that have caused a youth to become at-risk, the idea here is that the religious leaders will provide the youth with more accurate information and guidance about the religion in order to cancel any false beliefs of the religion the youth may hold.

Terrorists have big imaginations in coming up with new ideas for achieving their ends, which means that indicators that are important today may not be important tomorrow. They are always finding new and innovative ways of carrying out their attacks; therefore, there is a need to evolve and continuously refine all intelligence agencies, police, and law enforcement in the way they view terrorists. Indeed, collection and information sharing or intelligence respecting activities that may, on reasonable grounds, be suspected of constituting threats to the security of Canada should be undertaken on an ongoing basis. If Canada wants to be ahead of the game, they must continue to use the same amount of imagination that terrorists use when planning their attacks.

As there are little direct community-based programs for countering youth violent extremism in Canada, community groups have taken it upon themselves to educate the public, provide social services, and liaise with government agencies (Jacoby, 2016). However, the RCMP does currently have a program known as the Integrated National Security Enforcement Team (INSET) which runs in four major cities (Vancouver, Toronto, Ottawa, and Montreal) that is used to help increase the capacity of collection, sharing, and

analysis of national security intelligence and to enhance their investigative capabilities by bringing more resources together (RCMP, 2018). The program is a collaborative effort between the RCMP, CSIS, CBSA, and municipal police services.

Continuing research and analysis into antecedent behaviours related to terrorist activities to better inform investigations, partner agencies, the government, and the public on current and emerging trends is paramount. One of the most important policies to develop and apply is that information sharing between agencies and the various strategic and tactical units attempting to prevent these acts. Sharing knowledge about precursor events, radicalization efforts, methods and means employed to execute the attacks, and all other information that may shed light on the potential for further attacks must be shared in a timely fashion. A major move toward this end is enhancing of the program management system for information sharing seeks to work with federal, provincial, local, and/or international partners to make relevant information available to decision makers (Wormeli, 2014). Currently, many legislative and policy issues, such as privacy laws, hinder the ability of agencies to share information. With better legislation and laws in the name of national security, even better and smoother information sharing systems and processes can be developed and implemented.

Education

Youth today are tomorrow's adults. They hold the key to future success. They have an active role and contribution to make to society. Denying them such an opportunity by not providing them access and resources to education and employments can negatively affect their future. This leaves them disconnected, deprived, and vulnerable to negative influences, and potentially vulnerable to radicalization. The assumption is that through higher education will come greater understanding and empathy if accompanied by positive,

prosocial interactions with the community and fostering an individuals' sense of belonging. In addition to focusing on those at risk, educating the macro culture about different cultures and ways to deal with each other can promote harmony and trust within the community and reduce some of the variables associated with youth radicalization. Regarding the countering violent extremism programs, scholars emphasize reintegration, education, and community support following disengagement to maximize the success of such programs (Porta & Lafree, 2012).

Providing realistic alternatives and future prospects outside of the violent extremist group also increases the prospect for disengagement and can reduce the likelihood of recidivism (University of Amsterdam, 2013). Adding a critical thinking component to Canadian schools can give youth a foundation to question and be curious about their surroundings, their culture, and the messages presented to them in the media and online. Another important avenue is to educate Canadians regarding the genuine threat of terrorism. Recent experience and media attention on terrorist activities may serve to increase the perception that the terrorist threat is more imminent or widespread than it actually is (Wittendorp, 2016). Through education, Canadians may become less fearful of the terrorist threat and more proactive in being tolerant of different belief systems and cultures. Though there are many potentially positive outcomes of improved education, including less hostility and a greater sense of safety, education alone is insufficient to change the perceptions of everyone.

Education is only one facet of the counter-terrorism, counter-radicalization, and counter-extremism response. There would be many challenges as people can become very entrenched in their belief systems and trying to change those beliefs from the outside could prove difficult. The overarching goal should be to provide the knowledge and skills for how

to address and prevent the conditions that contribute to a youth's radicalization process as quickly and effectively as possible. The process starts from very basic levels; family, friends, peers, schools, and community. When a youth is given support, encouragement, and motivation to excel within his or her community, he or she will have a stronger connection to that community, which results to a better overall enjoyment of life. When a youth feels a connection to their community, they are more likely to continue schooling, find work, and have positive social bonds; all elements that serve as a counter-balance to radicalization.

One way that this could be accomplished is by supporting at risk and identified youth through countering violent extremism programs that contain a strong educational component that focuses on developing critical thinking, problem-solving capabilities, confidence, and self-esteem. This is supported by the work of Veencamp and Zeiger (2015) who argued that the support of families coupled with a focus on educational institutions could build resiliency within communities. By teaching "critical thinking skills, civic education, community engagement and volunteerism in schools," which could "help address the drivers of violent extremism in certain countries" (Veenkamp & Zeiger, 2015, p.155).

Summary

To achieve best practices in countering homegrown terrorism, there is a need to better understand the various forces that encourage youth to adopt violent extremism and the best means of combating these forces (Dugas & Kruglanski, 2014). More than 5,200 people from Western Europe and North America have joined ISIS and other terror groups in Syria and Iraq; however, only 180 of those 5,200 travelers were Canadian (RCMP, 2018). It is also generally accepted that while only a small percentage of foreign fighters will ever return to their country of origin, the potential for these individuals to pose a threat upon

returning has been a concern for many governments, including Canada. Though the number of Canadian fighters joining groups like ISIS appears to be relatively small compared to other Western countries (Neumann, 2015), it has the potential to become a significant homeland security threat if it is not acknowledged, understood, and addressed. Moreover, this number does not include those who attempt to leave Canada to join extremist groups in the Middle East or elsewhere, but are prevented from leaving Canada.

Scholarly discussion has largely focused on the process of radicalization and the various factors contributing to it. Visualizing individuals' radicalization process from the initial formation of extremist sympathies to violent action is very important if we are to identify and respond to the precursory dynamic indicators of radicalization (Klausen et al., 2016). Programs for countering violent extremism and de-radicalizing youth are also varied in approach. Some programs contain a clear focus on religion, while others focus on bringing together various segments of society, such as minority groups and the macro culture, to learn about each other (Ekici, 2015).

Such programs need to build their programs based on local populations and local issues and concerns. As a result, the efforts of organizations, like the RCMP, which typically go into community with the intent to establish communication based on trust and tolerance, can be less effective if, for example, Muslims in that community see the police as a threat. In fact, building relationships between police and minorities could promote cooperation and maintain "effective communication and access to information" (Ekici, 2015, p. 184). As the primary responsibilities of the police are to build and maintain trust in the community, effectively doing so can facilitate a pathway to a de-radicalization process for at risk youth.

Mentoring, counseling, and offering financial, educational, and recreational facilities can also be an effective means to build up trust and encourage youth who are subjected to radicalization to cooperate. It is widely accepted by scholars that community policing with a focus on developing perceived community safety and trust between the police and public is an effective approach (Dunn, Atie, Kennedy, Jan, O'Reilly, and Rogerson, 2015). In fact, good governance, educational opportunities, employment opportunities, and hope for those who might otherwise be drawn into terrorist movements must stay at the heart of the fight against terrorism. Soft power measures are equally important, so that individuals who resonate to the calls of terrorists actually do find dignity, personal significance, opportunity and prosperity in their lives without believing they should resort to terrorist violence. These strategies can also be effective in addressing the issues of radicalization and mobilization to violence approach with the specific aim of addressing obstacles to countering radicalization.

The process theory is also known as the "religious conveyor belt" theory as it cites Islamic mosques as "incubators" that cultivate the process of radicalization and relies primarily on religion as a driver (Williams, 2016). Practices based on this theory might arouse concerns over the civil rights violation and perceived as a contradicting with Canadian Charter of rights and Canadian human rights Act. Therefore, Canada and other Western countries must be cautious when implementing a de-radicalization program that focuses on ideology or religion, as they were presumably protectors of free speech and had to be "very careful not to include an ideological component to their work " (Koehler, 2015, p.95).

Establishing local intervention groups involving parents, police officers, government officials, trauma-informed counselors, youth activists, faith leaders, and violence-prevention experts who are committed to stemming the precursors of violent extremism, such as social

alienation, psychological disorders, political grievances, and Islamic extremist-inspired ideologies is critical. Having stakeholders from all segments of a community dedicated to public safety and preventing violent extremism can reduce homegrown radicalization by creating public awareness about the risk factors and empowering the appropriate figures to intervene with vulnerable individuals. The success of these intervention programs relies on a trusting relationship among these local groups, whereby persons who may be radicalized, regardless of the reason, are identified and intervened with.

The success of programs rely on adequate resources, an objective independant evaluation, and a trusting relationship, rather than judgment or stereotypes among local police, school counsellors, community services agencies, and faith leaders. The sharing of information between the groups and law enforcement or intelligence agencies is a necessary and effective tool for assessing potential terrorists and violent extremists. Using innovative methods, relying on community engagement, consent, trust, and confidence can be successful, rather than continuing to isolate youth and communities, maintaining a poor understanding of each other, and not building honest and meaningful relationships with targeted communities (Shahzad, 2014).

In terms of public safety, individuals who are screened or identified at being at-risk by their parents, teachers, community members, or law enforcement may be referred to counselling, faith guidance, civic and political engagement programs, positive support networks, social housing, education, or health services. In cases where the intervention is unsuccessful or in cases with a youth may not want or refuses to participate, law enforcement, including intelligence agencies, must be notified to ensure the youth is effectively monitored.

Conclusion

September 11, 2001 is a milestone in the history of modern-day terrorism. At that moment, the United States suddenly found itself in a war with unknown enemies armed with an extremist Islamic ideology. The underlying philosophy of Islamic terrorist groups, like al-Qaeda or ISIS, involves an ideological hatred of the West and its cultural dominance throughout the world, but particularly in Muslim countries. Using an extremist view of their religion and an interpretation of historical and current events that place them as the only and true defenders of their faith, extremists exploit poverty, social inequality, westernization, modernization, religious fundamentalism, and group and individual psychological factors to radicalize youth to terrorism (Ziemke, 2006).

Both countering violent extremism and de-radicalization programs in the West appear to be formulated with a good understanding of the radicalization process and the risk factors associated with mobilization to violence. Some of these programs focus, almost exclusively, on the religious or ethnic factors that can contribute to radicalization, but fail to address other social factors that may affect youth (Gayle, 2016). Moreover, many programs focused exclusively on Muslim youth, to their detriment. To be most effective, de-radicalization approaches should focus on all “fragile communities, not just Muslims” (Butler, 2015, p.20).

From the social perspective, the attractiveness of terrorist groups to second and third-generation Muslim immigrants is rooted in their experiences of the social gap between their communities and the macro culture, social, political, economic, and religious marginalization, and, at times, a very rudimentary or misinformed understanding of Islam (Deardan, 2016). Moreover, as poverty and the lack of social mobility are factors that promote radicalization, a proactive approach to countering youth violent extremism must

include a focus on improving the socioeconomic condition of youth, primarily through educational and the development of genuine economic opportunities.

Some of the limitations of these programs include the lack of meaningful consultations with effected or targeted communities and a general absence of focusing on building resiliency among youth. As a result, cases of extremism could worsen if root causes are not addressed. Moreover, regarding the importance of trust within communities, Canada's formal de-radicalization programs are not necessarily better than informal community connections. A reason for this is that many extremists have a predisposed dislike of the current government and police, therefore, they are less receptive to government-led programs, whereas with community-based programs, a connection may be easier to be built.

The research suggests that the process of radicalization from an initial exploration of extremist ideas to being mobilized to violence takes, on average, about five years (Klausen et al., 2016). This provides a significant amount of time for disengagement, de-radicalization, and reintegration intervention programs and strategies to be used with an identified at-risk youth. Since youth largely radicalize as a result of psychological, social, or identity reasons, it follows that both preventative and remedial measures must address these issues (Chin, Gharaibeh, Woodham, & Deeb, 2016).

Creating a typology of radicalized youth, linking these typologies to established theoretical models, and developing effective and targeted counter-strategies by the preventative approach of counter-radicalization is the key. De-radicalization and countering violent extremism programs must partner with the Muslim community and listen to their concerns and issues. Identifying youth who may be involved in radicalization or are at-risk of adopting extremist views would be more practical if their community's leaders, faith

leaders, teachers, and families were legitimate stakeholders in the programs, contributed to the development of the interventions, and were meaningful partners in the process. The involvement of people from different ethnic backgrounds that represent the targeted group of youth is also important.

Establishing a judgment-free environment in the such programs, utilizing intelligence agencies for early detection of terrorist behavior, and focusing on prevention as a critical component of a CVE's strategy that is partnered with police, local governments, and NGOs designed to challenge radical Islamism through supporting individuals at-risk of radicalization and strengthening the capacities of communities to prevent radicalization and resolve grievances that violent extremist groups might exploit is also critical (Chin et al., 2016). For example, in Canada, de-radicalization and countering violent extremism programs focus on community engagement, providing a safe space for youth, open dialogue, and investing in mental health and education. A focus on these issues can contribute to a youth's successful integration in Canada and can create a positive sense of belonging and identity.

To reduce the chances of radicalization and mobilization to violence among youth, Canada should consider proactive investments, on a much larger scale, focused on youth well-being. This could prevent vulnerable youth from being attracted to and joining violent extremist groups and can similarly reduce the chances of their involvement in gangs and other criminal activities. Canada can incorporate the lessons learned and to be learned from the UK and U.S., particularly with respect to the importance of building trustful relationships and networks between the public and those providing the service.

Recommendations

The recommendations provided below serve as a platform for understanding and recognizing the problem of radicalization and tackling it at a strategic, tactical, and operational level. As discussed throughout this major paper, to address youth radicalization effectively requires a proactive approach that engages agencies of public safety and the community. However, the government should avoid adopting strict measures against youth within a community as this can feed Muslim community suspicions that the government cannot be trusted. For example, police should not engage in strict stereotyping or racist profiling, nor should they force community members to participate in Westernized practices. The government should be acting as a genuine partner interested in working with the community. Critically, the development and evaluation of new policies and interventions are necessary to build community resilience to violent extremism in Muslim diaspora communities in the U.S. and Canada.

In terms of enhancing community safety, countering terrorism, and interrupting the various pathways that lead to youth radicalization, it is important to create a typology of radicalized youth, link these typologies to established theoretical models, and develop effective and targeted counter-strategies. This likely includes structured government-led programs in addition to supporting the role that mentors, parents, community leaders, religious leaders, and peer groups can play in deterring and preventing youth radicalization.

Refugee and immigrant parents often face great difficulties in Canada resettlement, and often lack adequate social support or social services to help them and their children adjust to their new lives (Durden, 2016). One of the reasons already identified for the number of radicalized youth with a refugee background in the Western countries has been a conflict between maintaining their religious duty and obligation and conforming to Western

culture. For example, refugee youth may have strong ties with their religion and with religious leaders; however, they may encounter different, and often negative, viewpoints about Islam from the public. This could cause the youth to go one of two ways, either move away from their religious faith or move towards extremist.

Youth, especially first generation youth, face a large number of cultural, economic, and political barriers, such as language, acculturation, assimilation, and social norms. As employment and education plays an important role in the level of community bond, it is important to understand that youth ages 16 to 24 years have lower levels of employment compared to those youth who have some college education or have already graduated with a degree (Enchautegui, 2014). Therefore, it is important to make sure opportunities are available for both work and education. Youth who feel a lack of belonging or connection to their community may feel compelled to seek out other likeminded youth, which can be found online. Recruiters to extremist groups are quite adept at finding these youths online and providing them with information and peer groups that encourage radicalization. Once a youth has made these kinds of connections and has begun down the pathway to radicalization, in order to disengage them from extremist views, peers, and social network, there is a need to provide them a viable and alternative identity and support network (Shepard, 2016).

In order to combat the pull of radicals and extremist views on at-risk youth, a focus on families is necessary, as is a positive, prosocial connection with their community. Having positive community support increases the probability that a radicalized youth can be successfully re-integrating into their family and community (Hair, Moore, Ling, McPhee-Baker, Brown, 2009). In effect, the family, the community, and other leaders can become

appropriate role models for youth, thus dissuading them from continuing down the pathway to radicalization and mobilization to violence.

Social Identity Theory suggests that if youth are not provided with the space to explore and discuss their ideas, their worldviews, and their cultural and religious identities, there are vast opportunities online that will present a radical or extremist view in support of the youth's concerns or experiences. If youth are not given the opportunity to address different beliefs with their families, in their schools, or in the community, they may lose that sense of both self and of belonging to a certain group in a positive manner (Stets & Burke, 2000). Implementing any such approach, therefore, needs to focus on developing opportunities for youth to discuss their feelings and experiences with experts from the community that can provide context or information that helps the youth develop a more positive and prosocial identity and worldview. Given this, it is critical that communities have the necessary mechanisms for early identification of youth who may be radicalizing toward violence and a means of providing off-ramps for these youth before the criminal justice system becomes engaged.

It is clear that Islamic extremism has charismatic leaders and recruiters with the skills and organizational capacity to attract marginalized and isolated youth to their cause. With respect to Islamic radicalization, youth are being put on the path to violence at home and abroad by religious propaganda and online activities, sometimes through the local mosque. With a focus on the injustices suffered by Muslims at home and abroad, extremist narratives attempt to stir up a sense of hatred and revenge against the West from within Muslim communities.

There are over 100 mosques and Islamic centers scattered across Canada (IRC, 2018), and like in other Western countries, second only to social media, are the most

popular places for extremists to recruit young people who may be susceptible to fundamentalist and extremist rhetoric. The ideology of Islamic fundamentalism runs counter to the values of the Enlightenment and modernity. Some of its key features include a fervent opposition to women's freedom, civil rights, religious freedom, and political pluralism with antagonism towards the arts and modern civilization. In many ways, these groups rely on violence and terror to reestablish a society that existed during the time of the Prophet Mohammed. To assist in achieving this, these groups use extremist rhetoric and the promise of salvation for those youth who kill and die on behalf of this ideal.

Countering homegrown terrorism and youth radicalization is fraught with many challenges. As Canadians continue to demand security and safety within the contexts of individual rights and freedoms and privacy, the struggle against terrorism and Islamic Fundamentalism is very difficult. As Gelber (2018) proposed, greater policies should be enacted that address the indirect enablers of violent extremism, such as criminalizing the encouragement of terrorism which is already implemented in Canada, banning organizations that encourage or glorify terrorism, and banning the displaying of clothing or items that symbolize prohibited groups. One counter argument to this that it may go against individual's Charter of Rights and Freedom; however, this still could happen if it is for national security and for preventing hatred of others. By further expanding on the current innovative and policies in place, we may be able to minimize the opportunities for some groups to induce others, including vulnerable youths, to commit acts of religiously motivated violence.

It is not acceptable to the Canadian government that religious and ethnic minorities living in Canada should refuse to integrate into a liberal democracy. As a Mosaic-type country, Canada actively encourages citizens to maintain their culture and beliefs, but

within the context of Canadian values. It certainly does not insist or encourage immigrants to abandon their values, culture, or beliefs, but rather contribute to the cultural richness of the country by combining their traditional values, beliefs, and practices with Canadian culture. In their view, minorities' ethnic traditions must be respected and valued. As a result, this attitude can serve to improve relationships between communities, and provide avenues for immigrant youth to integrated more fully into Canada and reject the calls from extremists.

Youth who are suffered from religious discrimination, isolation, and social inequalities are more likely to be attracted to the extremists' propaganda and are more likely to be targeted by recruiters in the hopes that these youths will either join these groups or can be mobilized to violence on behalf of these groups and their ideologies. In accordance to Canadian countering violent extremism programs, it is crucial to educate youth on alternatives to these radical perspectives and to foster positive identities that support their ethnic and religious backgrounds, but reject fundamentalism and the use of violence to promote political or religious ideologies. When it comes to de-radicalizing youth who are already on that path, it is critical to replace a youth's online social network, when it involves people or groups that espouse radical views with prosocial online and real-world peer groups (Shepard, 2016).

The nature of terrorism has changed over the past decade. Terrorism used to require large amounts of money, advanced weapons, and the support of a government. Today, terrorism only requires a driver's license, a small amount of case, and a heart full of hate. Nonetheless, we should remember not to neglect the threat posed by non-Islamic terrorism either. By only focusing exclusively on immigrants and Muslim communities, we limit the success of de-radicalization for all at-risk individuals. Non-Islamic terrorism does exist as

evident in the rise of non-Islamic terrorism committed by white citizens. For example, the case of Alexandre Bissonnette, a 27 year old who terrorized a Quebec community, or the case of terror suspect Aaron Driver of Strathroy, Ontario. (Canadian Press, 2017).

Similar to other countries, Canada is not exempt from youth radicalization to terrorism. The literature confirms that Muslim youth who become radicalized do so for reasons, including a lack of education, economic hardship, and social isolation. Moreover, there is not a one-size-fits-all typology of the typical youth who is at risk for radicalization; some are attracted to the thrill and violence associated with this ideology, some are attention seekers, some suffer from mental illness, but some are well educated and come from middle-class families. It is clear that more research is needed to understand the relationship between youth identity, discrimination, social integration, and radicalism, and what are the most effective strategies and approaches to preventing and responding to Islamist-inspired terror attacks.

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